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INTRODUCTION
In this Article we raise questions concerning the widely accepted
proposition that economic efficiency requires that copyright protec-
tion should be limited in its duration The Constitution authorizes
Congress to create copyright and patent protection "for limited
Times." The first federal copyright act was enacted in 1790 and pro-
vided for an initial term of fourteen years plus a renewal term of the
same length, provided the author was still living at the end of the ini-
tial term. The initial term was lengthened to twenty-eight years in
1831, and the renewal term to twenty-eight years in 1909, to forty-
seven years beginning in 1962, and to sixty-seven years beginning in
t Landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law and Economics at The University of
Chicago. Posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lec-
turer at The University of Chicago Law School. We thank Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, and par-
ticipants in the Harvard Law School's law and economics workshop (where a previous version of
this Article was given on March 12,2002), along with Michael Abramowicz, Scott Kieff, Elisabeth
Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and especially Jane Ginsburg and Douglas Lichtman, for extensive and
highly valuable comments on a previous draft, and Peter Broadbent, Bryan Dayton, and espe-
cially Brian Grill for their excellent research assistance.
1 See, for example, Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners, Eldred v Ashcroft, No 01-618, *10-12 (US Sup Ct filed May 20,2002) (available on Lexis
at 2001 US Briefs 618) ("Akerlof Brief") (arguing that extending the copyright term increases
the social cost of monopoly).
2 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. For a detailed discussion of the history of this provision and
specifically its reference to "limited Times," see Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and
Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J Intel Prop L 315, 315-64
(2000). For a more general discussion on this clause, see Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Sup-
posed to Promote? Defining 'Progress' in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Consti-
tution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 Neb L Rev 754 (2001).
3 Act of May 31, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat 124,124.
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1998.4 The Copyright Act of 1976 switched from a fixed to a variable,
but still limited, term equal to the life of the author plus fifty years, in-
creased to seventy years in 1998 by the Copyright Term Extension Act
(popularly known as the "Sonny Bono" Act).Until the 1976 Act, fed-
eral copyright protection was largely limited to published works, other
works being mainly protected by (state) common law copyright, which
had no time limit, although an unpublished work could be federally
copyrighted by being registered with the Copyright Office. A substan-
tial fraction of all federally copyrighted works were of this character.6
Except in the case of works for hire (works in which the employers, or
occasionally other hirers, of the actual creators of the works are the
copyright owners), publication lost much of its significance under the
1976 Act, which protected works fixed in a tangible form, whether or
not they were published. As for works for hire, the 1976 Act fixed a
term of seventy-five years from publication or one hundred years
from creation, whichever expired first; the Sonny Bono Act extended
these terms to ninety-five and one hundred twenty years. The 1976 Act
also made works created after January 1, 1978 nonrenewable, but it al-
lowed assignments and other transfers of copyrights to be terminated
by the author or his heirs.
The legal significance of the Constitution's phrase "limited
Times" is unclear (the motivation-a hostility deeply rooted in Anglo-
American law and politics to government-conferred monopoly-is
clear enough). Any time short of infinity, which is to say any fixed pe-
riod of years, is "limited" in the literal sense of the word; and even if
"limited" means something far short of infinity, this limitation might
conceivably be circumvented by allowing repeated extensions of the
copyright term. Renewals and extensions of patents and copyrights
had been common in England in the eighteenth century, though on an
individual rather than on a wholesale basis, and it was English practice
4 Act of Feb 3,1831 § 1,4 Stat 436,436 (twenty-eight year initial term); Act of Mar 4,1909
§ 23, 35 Stat 1075,1080 (twenty-eight year renewal term); Joint Resolution of Sep 19,1962, Pub L
No 87-668, 76 Stat 555, 555 and eight subsequent statutes cited in Historical and Revision Notes,
Extension of Renewal Terms under Prior Law, 17 USC § 304(a) (2000) (preventing subsisting re-
newal terms from expiring between 1962 and 1976); Copyright Act of 1976 § 304(a)-(b), Pub L
No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, 2573-74 (forty-seven year renewal term); Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act § 102(d), Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827, 2827-28 (1998), codified at 17 USC
§ 304(a) (sixty-seven year renewal term).
5 Copyright Act of 1976 § 302(a), 90 Stat at 2572-73, codified as amended by the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(b), 112 Stat at 2827, at 17 USC § 302(a) (2000).
6 From July 1, 1974 through September 30, 1977, unpublished works comprised about 30
percent of new copyright registrations. See Copyright Office, 1975 Annual Report of the Register
of Copyright 19 (Library of Congress 1976) (104,006 unpublished works out of 401,274 total reg-
istrations); Copyright Office, 1976 Annual Report of the Register of Copyright 30 (Library of
Congress 1977) (31,165 unpublished works out of 108,762 total registrations); Copyright Office,
1977 Annual Report of the Register of Copyright 34 (Library of Congress 1978) (121,317 unpub-
lished works out of 452,702 total registrations).
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that provided the model and inspiration for the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution and for the early federal copyright statutes.7 Then too,
common law copyright (now largely preempted by the federal copy-
right statute) was perpetual; and so it is conceivable that states could
recognize copyright after the expiration of federal copyright protec-
tion if the federal copyright law disclaimed any intention of preempt-
ing state law. And while Congress could not grant perpetual copyright
under the authority of the Constitution's Copyright Clause, maybe it
could do so under other grants of power to Congress, such as the
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. That seems
unlikely, however, since the Framers clearly intended to limit, as well
as confer, congressional authority to grant patents and copyrights. In
any event, we are interested in the economics of indefinitely renewing
the copyright term and express no view on its legality.!
In this Article, we use the term "indefinite renewal" rather than
"perpetual" copyright because there is an important economic differ-
ence between granting perpetual copyrights and granting copyrights
for a limited time with, however, a right to renew the copyright as
many times as the owner (including the original owner's heirs and
other successors) wants. We recognize that the present system of fixed
nonrenewable copyright terms and a system of indefinite renewals are
not the only alternatives. In particular, a system of indefinite renewals
could have an upper bound: perhaps an initial term of twenty years
and a maximum of six renewal terms of ten years each, for a maxi-
mum duration of eighty years. We shall consider this alternative to a
"pure" system of indefinite renewals at various points in the Article.
Although a copyright that could be renewed indefinitely could
turn out to be perpetual, this is unlikely for any but a tiny fraction of
all copyrights. In the empirical part of this Article we show that fewer
than 11 percent of the copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964
were renewed at the end of their twenty-eight-year term, even though
the cost of renewal was small. ' And only a tiny fraction of the books
7 See Walterscheid, 7 J Intel Prop L at 355-56, 363-64 (cited in note 2).
8 Consider Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 489 US 141, 166-67 (1989) (not-
ing that state trade secret laws coexist with the federal patent scheme).
9 Compare Eldred v Ashcroft, 2003 US LEXIS 751, *16 (upholding the constitutionality of
the Sonny Bono Act).
10 The renewal fee was 50 cents from 1909 to 1928, see Act of Mar 4,1909 § 61, 35 Stat at
1087; $1 from 1928 to 1948, see Act of May 23, 1928 § 61, 45 Stat 713,714; $2 from 1948 to 1965,
see Act of Apr 27,1948 § 2,62 Stat 202,202; $4 from 1965 to 1977, see Act of Oct 27,1965, Pub L
No 89-297, 79 Stat 1072, 1072; $6 from 1978 to 1990, see Copyright Act of 1976 § 708(a)(2), 90
Stat at 2593; $12 from 1990 to 1992, see Copyright Fees and Technical Amendments Act of 1989,
Pub L No 101-318,104 Stat 287,287 (1990); $20 from 1992 to 1999, see Copyright Renewal Act of
1992, Pub L No 102-307,106 Stat 264,266; $45 from 1999 to 2002, see 37 CFR § 201.3 (2001); and
$60 from July 1, 2002 to the present, see 37 CFR § 201.3 (2002). We add that cost might be sig-
nificant for individuals who are renewing a group of individual works at the same time. To take
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ever published are still in print; for example, of 10,027 books pub-
lished in the United States in 1930, only 174, or 1.7 percent, were still
in print in 2001." These data suggest that most copyrights depreciate
rapidly and therefore few would be renewed if even a slight fee were
required; the sheer bother of applying for renewal appears to be a sig-
nificant deterrent. The in-print data are indeed merely suggestive,
since it costs more to keep a book in print than to renew a copyright
and since a copyrighted work's derivative works may have commercial
value after the original work has lost it. Nevertheless, it is apparent
that even with an unlimited right of renewal the public domain would
remain a vast repository of intellectual "property" (in a legal sense,
nonproperty) available for use without charge and also usable as free
inputs into the creation of new intellectual property. Paradoxically, a
system of unlimited renewals might, depending on the length of the
initial term and on the fee structure, expand the number of works in
the public domain, although the average (and conceivably the total)
value of the works in the public domain might fall since copyright in
the most valuable works would probably be renewed many times.
Furthermore, it is a mistake to treat the public domain as a fixed
supply of works from which any enlargement of copyright protection
subtracts. The size of the public domain is in part a positive function of
the extent of copyright protection, since, as a first approximation, the
more extensive copyright protection is, the greater the incentive to
create intellectual property-some fraction of which will become a
part of the public domain when the copyright expires or, under the
system we are suggesting, is not renewed.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I is a critical review of
the economic arguments for limiting the duration of copyright protec-
tion. Part II questions the conventional view that the public good
character of intellectual property implies that once a copyrighted
work falls into the public domain, it will be allocated and exploited ef-
ficiently; we show that just as an absence of property rights in tangible
an example, consider a photographer who might have taken fifty photographs of a particular
event and desires to renew the copyright on all fifty pictures. His total renewal fee would be fifty
times the statutory fee. Prior to 1992, a copyright holder who wanted to renew his copyright had
to file a renewal application during the last year of the initial copyright term. An amendment
that year to the Copyright Act made renewals automatic, although there still are some benefits
to filing for renewal registration. See Robert A. Gorman and Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright: Cases
and Materials 356-57 (Foundation 6th ed 2002).
11 We are indebted for this computation to Lawrence Lessig, who based it on data in li-
brary and book annuals. See, for example, W.I. Fletcher, ed, Co-Operative Index to Leading Peri-
odicals (F Leypoldt 1884); American Library Annual (R.R. Bowker 1918); Wyllis E. Wright, ed,
American Library Annual (R.R. Bowker 1956); Wyllis E. Wright, ed, American Library Annual(R.R. Bowker 1957); Madeline Miele, ed, The Bowker Annual of Library & Book Trade
Information (R.R. Bowker 19th ed 1974); Bowker's Books in Print, online at
http://www.booksinprint.com (visited Feb 28,2003).
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property would lead to inefficiencies, so an absence of copyright pro-
tection for intangible works may lead to inefficiencies because of con-
gestion externalities and because of impaired incentives to invest in
maintaining and exploiting these works. Part III presents our empiri-
cal analysis of the expected duration of copyrights and trademarks, us-
ing data on registrations and renewals over the past ninety years. Our
interest in trademark renewals derives from the fact that trademarks
may be renewed indefinitely for ten-year periods, and an empirical
analysis of these renewals may cast light on the likely performance of
a system of indefinite renewals for copyrights. We find that both copy-
rights and trademarks are subject to significant depreciation and have
an expected or average life of only about fifteen years, and also that
renewal rates are highly sensitive to renewal fees. These findings sug-
gest that a system of indefinite copyright renewals need not starve the
public domain.
I. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF A LIMITED COPYRIGHT TERM
Two propositions are widely believed by most economists; it is
the unrecognized tension between them that makes the question of a
limited versus indefinite copyright term an interesting and difficult
one. The first proposition is that so far as is feasible, all valuable re-
sources, including copyrightable works, should be owned, in order to
create incentives for their efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse.
The second proposition is that copyright should be limited in duration.
The reasons for the second proposition are several: (1) tracing costs
increase with the length of copyright protection; (2) transaction costs
may be prohibitive if creators of new intellectual property must obtain
licenses to use all the previous intellectual property they seek to in-
corporate;" (3) because intellectual property is a public good, any
positive price for its use will induce both consumers and creators of
subsequent intellectual property to substitute inputs that cost society
more to produce or are of lower quality, assuming (realistically how-
ever) that copyright holders cannot perfectly price discriminate;" (4)
because of discounting to present value, incentives to create intellec-
tual property are not materially affected by cutting off intellectual-
property rights after many years, just as those incentives would not be
materially affected if, during the limited copyright term, lucrative new
12 This point is emphasized in our previous paper on copyright law. See William M. Landes
and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325,357 (1989)
(arguing for fair use in cases where transaction costs are too high relative to the benefits of a li-
cense).
13 The second and third points both rest on the fact emphasized in our paper that creators
of intellectual property characteristically build heavily on earlier such property rather than
creating ex nihilo.
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markets for the copyrighted work, unforeseen when the work was cre-
ated, emerged; (5) in any event, retroactive extensions of copyright
should not be granted, because such extensions do not affect the in-
centive to create works already in existence," but the possibility of
such extensions invites rent-seeking.
These five points taken together imply that the optimal term of
copyright protection is determined by balancing at the margin the in-
centive effects of a longer term against both the administrative and
the access costs arising from the public goods aspect of intellectual
property; by "access costs" we mean both the deadweight losses from
limiting output and the transaction costs involved in obtaining a li-
cense from the copyright owner granting access to a copyrighted work.
Since the incremental incentive to create new works as a function of a
longer term is likely to be very small (given discounting and deprecia-
tion) beyond a term of twenty-five years or so,'6 access costs will tend
to dominate, implying an optimal copyright term considerably shorter
than the current term of life plus seventy years. Thus, the second
proposition (limited copyright terms) denies the first (valuable re-
sources should be owned) and asserts that copyrightable intellectual
property should be taken out of private ownership and placed in the
public domain after a period of years no greater than necessary to in-
duce the socially efficient incentives to create new works. But is the
second proposition sound? It may be, for there undoubtedly are cases
in which property rights cost more than they are worth (a homely ex-
ample-a spatial counterpart to the temporal limitation of copy-
right-is shopping malls that do not charge for parking, thus treating
their parking lot as a commons). It has seemed so to many students of
copyright, but its soundness no longer seems obvious to us.
14 One must be cautious, however, in asserting that "unforeseen" opportunities will not af-
fect incentives. A particular new market may be unforeseen or unanticipated yet may be part of
a class of markets that when the work was created had a foreseen, positive probability of coming
into existence, and therefore may have influenced the incentive to create the work. See generally
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 Colum L
Rev 1613 (2001) (when copyright owners seek to exploit a new market that new technology has
opened, courts enforce the copyright law to preserve the copyright owners' exclusive rights
against innovative upstarts).
15 Not literally zero, because knowledge of the possibility of a future lengthening of the
copyright term might have some, though probably very small, incentive effects.
16 For example, suppose a copyright would yield $1 per year in perpetuity at a discount
rate of 10 percent. Under a system of perpetual copyright, the present value of this infinite
stream of income would equal $10 (=l/r). Under a limited copyright term (=t) the present value
would be (1-e")/r. Hence if t=25 and r=0.10, the present value of $1 per year for twenty-five
years is $9.18, which is more than 90 percent of the present value of a perpetual copyright. If the
value of the copyright depreciates by, say, 5 percent per year, the difference in present value be-
tween a perpetual and twenty-five-year copyright is only about 2.5 percent ($6.67 versus $6.51).
17 For a summary of the arguments in favor of a limited term, see Landes and Posner, 18 J
Legal Stud at 361-63 (cited in note 12).
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A. Tracing Costs
The argument for limiting copyright duration because of tracing
costs is superficial except in explaining why common law copyright in
unpublished works was (before the 1976 Copyright Act) perpetual:
Because there is usually only one copy of such works, the cost of de-
termining the copyright holder's identity is trivial unless the copy has
passed through many hands.' The argument for limiting duration is
superficial in other contexts, not because the costs of tracing the own-
ership of copyrighted works are inherently slight but because they
could probably be made slight by modest institutional reforms. Enor-
mous tracing costs would be incurred by any would-be publisher of a
new translation of the Iliad if the heirs of Homer could enforce copy-
right in the work, but that is only because no one knows who those
heirs are. Equally immense tracing costs would be required to deter-
mine the ownership of a parcel of land if titles to land were not re-
corded in a public registry. It is not perpetual property rights but the
absence of registration that creates prohibitive tracing costs.
Were a system of indefinitely renewable copyright to be
instituted today but limited to works created after the system was in
place, there need be no great difficulty in identifying copyright owners
a century or for that matter a millennium hence if, for example, the
law required copyright owners to reregister their copyrights every ten
or even twenty-five years in some central registry under the name of
the copyright holder and to notify the registry in the event the
copyright was transferred. The owner would be required to provide
the registry with his address and notify it of any changes of address; a
transferee would likewise be required to furnish this information to
the registry. Then a search of the registry under the name of the
original owner would reveal the address of the copyright holder from
whom a license would have to be sought. The analogy is to the
registries in which titles to real estate are recorded and to the
Uniform Commercial Code registries in which security interests in
personal property are recorded. A fee would be charged for renewing
a copyright registration in recognition of the costs imposed on the
registry itself and on the searchers. The fee could exceed those costs if
it were desired to expand the public domain by discouraging renewals
of works unlikely to have much commercial value.
18 An example is the discovery in the library of Harvard University of an unpublished
manuscript entitled The Inheritance, written by Louisa May Alcott in 1849. It had been miscata-
logued for many years, and no one knew of its existence. Although Alcott was childless, the copy-
right holders-fourth-generation descendants of Alcott's father-were not difficult to locate. See
Lawrence Van Gelder, Uncovered at Harvard:Alcott's First Novel, NY Times C15 (May 1, 1996).
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Tracing costs could be reduced further by requiring, when feasi-
ble, that a notice of copyright be placed on copyrighted works. Such a
notice, which would be a precondition of copyright protection, would
indicate the name of the copyright holder and the date of the most re-
cent copyright registration or renewal." This would enable a potential
user to determine readily whether the work was still protected and
with whom to get in touch if a license had to be obtained. Notice
would reduce tracing costs because the registry would have to be
searched only for the subset of works that were still under copyright.
Under existing law, the point at which copyright protection begins
is relatively unimportant because the duration of protection is deter-
mined not by that starting point but instead (except in the case of
works for hire) by the death of the author. Under a system of renew-
als, the starting point becomes critical. So our suggested system would
require a return to something like the pre-1976 law, where copyright
protection generally began with publication or registration; but we do
not explore these details in this Article.
We acknowledge a possible concern with joint ownership of copy-
rights; the more owners there are of a property, the greater will be the
tracing and transaction costs. But these problems arise in the case of
land and other physical property and are dealt with in a variety of
ways, such as by forming a trust or corporation to own or operate the
property, or by allowing partition. Problems of joint ownership of
copyrights can be solved in similar ways. The counterpart to partition
is the right of any joint owner of a copyright to license its use, subject
to a duty to account for the profits to the other owners. Tracing and
transaction costs reduce the value of property to its owner, thus giving
them an incentive to reduce these costs by consolidating ownership or
control.
B. Transaction Costs
The transaction costs argument against indefinite renewal (com-
pared to life plus seventy years or a single renewal term) is stronger
than the argument from tracing costs but must not be exaggerated.
Transaction costs, like tracing costs, might actually be lower under a
system of indefinite renewal, though this would depend on how the
19 For some works, it is true that up-to-date notices would not be feasible or would be too
costly relative to the potential benefits in lowering tracing costs. Suppose, for example, that A
sells a work of art but retains the copyright. A may be unable to place an up-to-date copyright
notice on a work that has been out of A's possession for many years. Other problems associated
with copyright notices must also be considered. For example, a strict notice requirement might
result in cluttering up a work of art with multiple notices that would detract from the artistic
merits of the work. Even in this case, it might be possible to place a notice on the back of the
canvas or on the back of the pedestal on which a sculpture stands.
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system was configured, in particular on the length of the initial and
renewal terms and on the renewal fee. Although transaction costs
would be incurred each time a copyright was renewed, consisting
mainly of the time costs of the copyright holder and the costs of ad-
ministering the renewal system, these costs would be slight if most
copyrights were not renewed--and the longer the initial term and the
higher the renewal fee, the fewer would be renewed.
The transaction costs incurred in negotiating for the licensing of
that minority of works on which the copyright has been renewed
many times would often be higher. In many cases, it is true, a new
work that potentially infringes the copyright on a very old one will in-
fringe only on a single work, for example (if there had been indefi-
nitely renewable copyright from the beginning of time) Ulysses and
the Odyssey, the movie Clueless and the novel Emma, West Side Story
and Romeo and Juliet, Ragtime and Michael Kohlhaas. And in that
event transaction costs should not be very high, provided that copy-
right protection is narrow and excludes ideas, mise en scene, and other
aspects of expressive works that go beyond the very specific, narrowly
defined form or configuration of the copyrighted work; and provided
that there is a broad fair-use doctrine that protects, for example, paro-
dies of copyrighted works from being treated as infringement. But
these are settled and economically rational features of copyright law
that we would not suggest be changed.
Transaction costs would be greatest for composite works, such as
anthologies. Under existing law, the publisher of a collection of the
world's greatest poems need obtain copyright licenses for only a sub-
set of the poems-none first published before 1923.0 Under a regime
of indefinitely renewable copyright instituted, say, in 1500 A.D., most
of the poems in an anthology of popular poetry might still be under
copyright protection, and therefore many more licenses would have to
be obtained for a new anthology.
The aggregate transaction costs of a system of indefinite copy-
right renewals would depend on the number (and possibly the value)
of licenses (holding tracing costs constant), the transaction costs per
license, and the administrative costs of operating a renewal system
(including the time and inconvenience costs that individuals incur in
renewing copyrights). Since the number of licenses would depend in
part on the total number of works renewed, aggregate transaction
20 The copyright on a work first published in 1922 would have terminated after seventy-
five years (a twenty-eight-year initial term plus a forty-seven-year renewal term) or in 1997. See
17 USC § 304(b) (1994). The Sonny Bono Act added an additional twenty years' protection to
works still protected in 1998. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(b)-(d), Pub
L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827,2827-28 (1998), codified at 17 USC §§ 302-04 (2000).
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costs could actually fall compared to a system of automatic renewals
or a single term of life plus seventy years.
We do not wish to be dogmatic about transaction costs, since their
magnitude has not been estimated. If they are thought to be very great
and especially if they are believed to increase exponentially with in-
creases in copyright duration, this could be a compelling argument for
placing an upper bound on the duration of copyright under a system
of (finite) renewal. Return for a moment to the example of West Side
Story and Romeo and Juliet. Shakespeare's play copied extensively
from an earlier Romeo and Juliet which in turn copied the plot from
Ovid's story of Pyramus and Thisbe. Had copyright been in force since
Ovid's day and if Ovid's heirs had renewed it right up to the present,
the producer of West Side Story might have to get a license from those
heirs as well as from Shakespeare's heirs (and doubtless from the
heirs of the author of the earlier Romeo and Juliet as well), assuming
the license obtained by Shakespeare from Ovid's heirs was limited as
it would normally be to Shakespeare's use of Ovid's story in his own
works.
C. Public Goods and Discounting to Present Value
The public goods argument for limiting the copyright term is
valid but overstated. The argument is best understood with the aid of
an example. Suppose the marginal cost of manufacturing and distrib-
uting a copy of some novel is $1, there are no fixed production costs(typesetting and editing costs are zero), but the author incurs a cost of
$1000 (mainly opportunity cost) to write the book-call this the cost
of expression. This is a fixed cost, which, because it does not vary with
output, does not influence output. As a result, in the absence of copy-
right, competition among publishers would expand output to the point
at which the price of the book fell to $1, which would just cover the
publisher's manufacturing and distribution costs and leave nothing
with which to compensate the author for his efforts. The incentive of
authors to write books would diminish, and with it the supply of new
copyrightable works." Copyright protection enables the publisher to
charge a price above $1 without worrying about competition from un-
authorized copies. A price of, say, $2 would more than cover the pub-
lisher's costs and enable a financial return to the author, encouraging
him to create new valuable works. But charging a $2 price generates
an offsetting social cost. Potential users who value the copyrighted
work at more than $1 but less than $2 substitute other goods. The re-
21 For a discussion of why some works would still be produced, and of alterative ways in
which authors might still receive financial compensation in the absence of copyright protection,
see Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 329-33 (cited in note 12).
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suit is a loss of value (deadweight loss) equal to the difference be-
tween these users' willingness to pay and the $1 marginal cost. Viewed
as an institution for promoting economic efficiency, the copyright sys-
tem seeks to balance the incentive gains from pricing expressive
works above marginal cost against the deadweight loss and other
costs. Protection beyond that point would yield additional benefits
that were more than offset by the higher costs.
From this standpoint, however, it may seem puzzling that the
copyright term is so long today, let alone that we should be suggesting
that it might be made even longer by being made renewable indefi-
nitely. On the one hand, the present value of $1,000 in royalties to be
received ninety-five years from now (life plus seventy years for a work
written twenty-five years before the author's death) is trivial, given
any plausible discount rate. On the other hand, such a long term of
copyright protection can create access (deadweight plus transaction)
costs by reducing the number of works that are in the public domain
at any given time and can therefore be appropriated without need to
obtain a license.
But this analysis is superficial in two respects. First, just as future
revenues must be discounted to present value to determine their
value, so future deadweight costs must be discounted to present value
to determine their present cost.2 If the present value of some remote
future benefit is trivial, so is the present cost of the equally remote fu-
ture deadweight loss. Second, because the scope of copyright protec-
tion is, as noted earlier, very narrow, the size of the deadweight loss
created by copyright protection is likely to be relatively small. The
narrower the scope of a property right, the more good substitutes
there are, the less the owner's monopoly power is, therefore, and so
the smaller is the deadweight loss that the monopoly creates. It has
even been argued that the optimal duration of a patent would be infi-
nite if the scope of patent protection were narrowed appropriately."
Conceivably the scope of copyright protection is already so narrow
that an infinite copyright term would not be a source of significant
deadweight loss. But this is merely a conjecture (are there good substi-
tutes, for example, for Shakespeare's plays or Mozart's piano concer-
22 But at the same rate? Future benefits should be discounted at the private discount rate
because we are concerned with their incentive effect. Future deadweight costs should be dis-
counted at a social discount rate lower than the private rate if it is believed that society has an in-
terest in its future inhabitants greater than individuals have for their remote descendants. We do
not pursue this issue in this Article.
23 See Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J
Econ 106,111 (1990) ("If one interprets patent policy broadly enough to include at least one pol-
icy instrument that affects the flow of profits from the sale of the patented product, then optimal
policy calls for infinitely-lived patents whenever patent breadth is increasingly costly in terms of
deadweight loss.").
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tos?), and one reason the scope is narrow is that the public domain
provides a source of free inputs into the creation of new copyrightable
works. If valuable works are withheld from the public domain because
the copyright term has been extended, there may be significantly
fewer public domain works (weighting number by quality) upon which
to draw, which will reduce competition with existing copyrightable
works.
Our earlier point about the need to discount future deadweight
costs loses most of its force, moreover, if the question is whether to ex-
tend the term of existing rather than future copyrights -at least exist-
ing copyrights that, unless extended, will soon expire. Suppose a copy-
right that was about to expire is extended another twenty years. The
deadweight costs will begin to accrue immediately. They still must be
discounted, but the present cost will be much greater than if the dis-
counting were merely of deadweight costs that were to be incurred in
a period beginning seventy-five years from now." The case for a sys-
tem of indefinite renewals may thus be stronger if it is limited to copy-
rights obtained after the system is instituted, although a potentially
offsetting benefit-reduced rent seeking-of a system not limited to
future copyrights will be noted shortly.
The length of the initial and renewal terms, the fee charged for
renewal, and the scope of renewal (would it be limited to a single
work, or could it cover a group of works?) can be adjusted to produce,
as a practical matter, whatever copyright term is deemed socially de-
sirable; nor need the length, fee, or scope be the same for all classes of
work (books, software, music, etc.). The shorter the initial grant (it
could be as short as five or ten years) and the higher the renewal fee,
the shorter the de facto term and so the fewer the number of works
that will be protected by copyright. The composition of the public do-
main might well differ under an indefinite-renewal system, because
there would be better sorting of works into two categories: (1) valu-
able works, where the benefits of property rights may exceed the costs,
and (2) works of little value, where the costs of administering copy-
right protection are very likely to exceed the benefits and a stiff re-
newal fee would discourage the owner from seeking continued copy-
right protection. We argue that this sorting might produce a more effi-
cient system of copyright than the present system.
24 This point is emphasized in the economists' amicus curiae brief in the Eldred case. Aker-
lof Brief at *11 (cited in note 1) (demonstrating that a deadweight loss today has a much larger
present value than a deadweight loss eighty years from now).
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D. Rent-Seeking
Owners of copyrights on old but still commercially valuable
works have an incentive to incur lobbying and related expenses to
persuade Congress to extend the copyright term on these works. Ret-
roactive extensions do not enhance incentives to create expressive
works, so if those incentives are the only benefits from copyright, such
extensions will increase access and transaction costs without produc-
ing any offsetting value. Moreover, as we just saw, they can be a potent
source of deadweight costs.
Consider Disney's successful efforts to lobby for the Sonny Bono
Act that extended its copyrights by twenty years in order to protect its
soon-to-expire copyrights on Mickey Mouse and other cartoon char-
acters.2 The costs of these efforts, and of the unsuccessful efforts of
competing interests to oppose the extension, were incurred to obtain
and limit economic rents, respectively, and if there are no offsetting
social benefits these costs were wasted from a social standpoint.
Rent-seeking activities are a natural consequence of any fixed
copyright term, since the Congress that enacts the term cannot pre-
vent future Congresses from increasing the term retroactively. There
will always be some copyright holders whose income will be dimin-
ished when their works fall into the public domain, and they have an
incentive to seek retroactive extensions as the end of the copyright
term draws near. The problem of rent-seeking that arises from the
possibility of retroactive extensions of copyrights would be solved by
indefinite renewals, though an alternative would be to interpret the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution to forbid retroactive extensions.
Since indefinite renewals would eliminate the prospect of losing the
income produced by old but still valuable copyrights, there would be
little incentive to lobby for copyright extensions. We say "little" rather
than "no" because resources might still be spent lobbying for lower
renewal fees and longer renewal terms. But normally it would be
cheaper to pay the renewal fee than to try to change the law. Notice,
however, that a system of indefinite renewals that was limited to fu-
ture copyrights would fail to curb the incentive to seek retroactive ex-
tensions of existing copyrights. Notice, too, that fixing an upper bound
to renewals would leave the rent-seeking problem unsolved, since, as
the work approached expiration, if it retained commercial value the
copyright holder would have an incentive to lobby for a right of fur-
ther renewal.
25 See Janet Wasko, Understanding Disney: The Manufacture of Fantasy 85-86 (Polity
2001). The Act went into effect October 27, 1998, four years before the copyright on Mickey
Mouse would have expired. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(b)-(d), 112
Stat at 2827-28.
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It might be objected that allowing indefinite renewals would
eliminate only one form of rent-seeking, because copyrights have
other dimensions of value, notably scope, besides duration. However,
whatever incentive there exists for lobbying for expansions of scope
exists under the current system; it would not be greater under a sys-
tem of indefinite renewals.
II. RATIONING AND MAINTAINING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Congestion Externalities
If we are correct so far, average copyright duration might well be
shorter under a system of indefinite renewals than under the current
system. Such a system might therefore reduce access costs for most
but not all works compared to the present system. (It probably would
not reduce deadweight costs, because these presumably are generated
mainly by valuable copyrights, which would tend to be renewed.) The
public goods argument asserts, however, that whatever the case with
regard to costs, there are no efficiency or social benefits from continu-
ing indefinitely to protect even a small number of valuable works. It is
this issue that we now take up. The argument assumes that the only
justification for copyright protection is the incentives it produces to
create new works. This may be wrong, or even anachronistic, since un-
til the 1976 Copyright Act, and in the case of works for hire right up to
the present day, federal copyright protection attached at dissemination
or registration rather than at creation.
The economic theory of property rights emphasizes not only their
incentive effects, that is, the investment that they encourage, but also
their effect in optimizing current uses of property. Frank Knight made
this argument many years ago, using the example of highway conges-
tion.26 An example closer to intellectual property is a natural pasture.
The purpose of assuming it to be natural rather than cultivated is to
abstract from the incentive benefits of recognizing a property right.
The natural pasture is not created by human effort and therefore
there is no social value in encouraging investments in creating it. But
in the absence of property rights the pasture would be overgrazed be-
cause none of the users would take account of the cost that his use
imposed on the other users by making their cattle graze more to ob-
tain the same amount of food. Thus, property rights would confer a so-
cial benefit but it would be unrelated to encouraging the creation of
new property.
26 Frank Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q J of Econ 582,
586-92 (1924) (arguing that the owner of a toll road would charge a toll that was socially effi-
cient).
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Analogous benefits of property rights are recognized in some ar-
eas of intellectual property. They are recognized in trademark law,
which does not impose any fixed limitation on the duration of a
trademark, since confusion would result if the same trademark de-
noted goods of different provenance and quality, and which, through
the concept of "dilution," protects trademark owners from the loss of
value resulting from nonconfusing duplication of their trademarks (as
where a hot dog stand adopts the name "Tiffany's"). And increasingly
they are recognized in the law of publicity rights as well, which pre-
vents others from using one's name or likeness in advertising or other
commercial uses without one's permission. The tendency is to make
these rights inheritable.2" The motive is not to encourage greater in-
vestment in becoming a celebrity (the incremental encouragement
would doubtless be minimal), but to prevent the premature exhaus-
tion of the commercial value of the celebrity's name or likeness.2
Recognition of an "overgrazing" problem in copyrightable works
has lagged. Typical is the statement of a large group of intellectual
property professors in opposition to the Sonny Bono Act:
The fundamental difference between tangible and intellectual
property is that intellectual property is a nondepletable com-
mons, while tangible property necessarily depletes with use. "The
tragedy of the commons" is that failure to recognize perpetual
and transferable property rights in tangible property leads inevi-
tably to "overgrazing," as soon as an item of property enters the
public domain from which everyone may draw freely. Recogni-
tion of perpetual property rights leads to economic efficiency, be-
cause a rational owner will optimize the balance between present
and future consumption.
There can be no overgrazing of intellectual property, however,
because intellectual property is not destroyed or even diminished
by consumption. Once a work is created, its intellectual content is
infinitely multipliable.
27 See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA Enter
L Rev 97, 124-26 (1994) (noting the split among courts on the issue of whether publicity rights
are inheritable and the legislative activity to make such rights inheritable). Consider Douglas G.
Baird, Does Bogart Get Scale? Rights of Publicity in the Digital Age, 4 Green Bag 2d 357,363-64
(2001).
28 See Grady, 1 UCLA Enter L Rev at 103,126 (cited in note 27) (arguing that an efficient
rule would protect valuable publicity rights after death to prevent the value from being dissi-
pated too quickly).
29 Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in
Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright Term Extension Act 9 (Jan 28,1998),
online at http:l/www.law.asu.edu/HomePageslKarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtensionlegmats/
1998statement.html (visited Feb 28,2003).
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This is overstated, if only because it ignores the trademark and
right-of-publicity cases-both examples of intellectual property the
value of which can be diminished by consumption. But before pro-
ceeding further, we must distinguish between technological and pecu-
niary externalities. The externality in the pasture case is technological
because it imposes a real cost on third parties (the other grazers),
rather than merely altering the distribution of wealth. Refusing to
recognize inheritable publicity rights could impose either type of ex-
ternality, or both types. If anyone could use Humphrey Bogart's name
or likeness in advertising, the aggregate value of that advertising use
might be greater even though Bogart's estate would lose income. In-
deed, if the marginal cost of additional copies of his image were zero,
the marginal utility would also be zero, even though the total utility
could be very great. But the total utility might fall if the lack of ex-
cludability and resulting proliferation of the Bogart image led to con-
fusion, the tarnishing of the image, or sheer boredom on the part of
the consuming public. Eventually the image might become worthless.
Apparently this is a concern of the Walt Disney Company with
regard to its copyrighted characters, such as Mickey Mouse.
To avoid overkill, Disney manages its character portfolio with
care. It has hundreds of characters on its books, many of them
just waiting to be called out of retirement .... Disney practices
good husbandry of its characters and extends the life of its
brands by not over-exposing them.... They avoid debasing the
30
currency.
FIGURE 1
COPYRIGHT EXTERNALITIES
............... ........ PO
QO Q1 Q2
Quantity
30 Bill Britt, Disney's Global Goals, Marketing 26 (May 17, 1990).
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Figure 1 illustrates the problem. DOD' is the demand schedule in
period t. Assume that the work has been under copyright for so long
that if the copyright expired today the expected return to the author
would have been sufficient to induce its creation. By assumption,
therefore, copyright protection in period t and all future periods
would have no effect on whether the work was created in period t=0.
It would create a deadweight cost illustrated by the P0Q2Q triangle in
Figure 1, which is caused by the copyright holder's charging a price
equal to P0 although marginal cost is zero. Terminating the copyright
in t would eliminate the deadweight loss, as the number of uses of the
work would increase to Q2, that is, until the value of the marginal use
equaled zero.
But now suppose that, contrary to the usual assumption about
copyrights, additional uses impose technological externalities. Then
terminating the copyright will lead not only to a movement along the
demand curve but also to a downward shift (say to D°D') in the over-
all demand, destroying value equal to the difference between the area
under the original demand curve D0 D' up to P0 and the area under
D°D1 up to a zero price. If the externalities are small, the difference
between the two demand curves could be negative, so that terminating
the copyright at t would increase value. But if they are large, termina-
tion would result in a net loss in value. In the limit, additional uses be-
yond Q' might depress the demand curve (as it rotates downward
around the point that intersects the vertical axis at D) until it coin-
cided with the vertical axis. In that event, terminating the copyright
would have destroyed all its previous value-the area under DOD'
from the point that intersects the vertical axis to the initial price and
quantity of P0 and Q'.
But how far is the concern with technological externalities that
has been flagged in reference to publicity rights actually applicable to
copyright? A book or other copyrightable property is, as we noted
earlier, a public good; its use by one consumer does not interfere with
its use by any other. This point cannot be decisive, however; a celeb-
rity's name or likeness has public good characteristics as well, yet
unlimited reproduction of the name or the likeness could prematurely
exhaust the celebrity's commercial value, just as unlimited drilling
from a common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool prematurely.
The same could be true of a novel or a movie or a comic book charac-
ter or a piece of music or a painting, particularly with regard to copy-
rights on components of completed works rather than on the com-
pleted works themselves. If because copyright had expired anyone
were free to incorporate the Mickey Mouse character in a book,
movie, song, etc., the value of the character might plummet. Not only
would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be
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blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as cat-
meat, others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the hen-
pecked husband of Minnie. In effect, there would be both a movement
along and shift downward in the demand curve in Figure 1 until
Mickey Mouse's commercial value was zero." To the extent that such
appropriations of the Mickey Mouse character were classified as
parodies, they would be sheltered by the fair-use doctrine. But not all
would be so classified,3" and in that event the fair-use doctrine would
not insulate them from liability under a regime of indefinitely renew-
able copyright.
We do not wish to press this argument too far. While examples
can even be given of works of elite culture that may have been de-
based by unlimited reproduction (the Mona Lisa, the opening of Bee-
thoven's Fifth Symphony, and several of Van Gogh's most popular
paintings come immediately to mind), there are counterexamples,
such as the works of Shakespeare, which seem undiminished by the
proliferation of performances and derivative works, some of them
kitsch, such as Shakespeare T-shirts and the movie Shakespeare in
Love.
B. Creation and Copying from the Public Domain
A second economic argument against limiting the duration of
copyright is unrelated to congestion or overuse externalities. It returns
us to the question of incentives. The conventional economic criticism
of unlimited duration draws too sharp a distinction between creation
and copying. Imagine a novel published many years ago in which
copyright has expired. The novelist is rediscovered and there is a surge
in demand for his novels. Since no publisher could establish a property
right in them, the incentives of publishers to publish and promote
31 In contrast, in the absence of negative technological externalities, terminating the copy-
right would reduce the marginal value to zero. But since the demand curve would be unchanged,
total value would increase because there would be no deadweight cost from termination.
32 The line the law draws in implementing the fair-use defense to copyright infringement is
between complementarity and substitution (or between productive and substitutable uses for the
copyrighted work), see, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600,1643-44
n 237 (1982) (giving examples of complementarity and substitution and stating that "comple-
mentarity should favor fair use"); or, so far as is relevant to our example, between parody and
burlesque, see Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J Legal Stud 67, 71 (1992)
("[Tihe parodist should not be allowed to take so large a fraction ... of the original work as to
make the parody a substitute for that work."). Uses of the Mickey Mouse character that were in-
tended to provide the audience with a substitute for the Disney Corporation's productions in-
corporating the character would not be considered fair use. Compare Ty, Inc v Publications In-
ternational, Ltd, 292 F3d 512, 517 (7th Cir 2002) (" [C]opying that is complementary to the copy-
righted work ... is fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work ... is not fair
use.").
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them might well be inadequate from a social standpoint. Often the
demand for particular works of intellectual property is unknown be-
fore they actually hit the market.33 Suppose an enterprising publisher
has only a 20 percent chance of success with obscure public-domain
authors. He publishes the works of five such authors in order to have
one success. In the absence of copyright protection, other publishers
can wait and see which author sells and then bring out their own ver-
sion of his works. Publishers who wait avoid the costs of failure, but
their free riding on the market information developed by the first to
publish reduces the incentive of any publisher to search for potentially
successful public domain works.m The tendency would be for only
works of already well-known and safe authors whose works were in
the public domain to be published.
Granted, a system of indefinite renewals is not a panacea for this
problem, since works that were no longer popular would tend not to
be renewed many times. This problem would exist even if copyright
were perpetual rather than either duration-limited or indefinitely re-
newable, since owners of a perpetual copyright that they considered
worthless would not take even modest steps to assure the continued
registration (for example, notifying the registry of changes of address)
that a system of perpetual copyrights would require. A complete solu-
tion would require that the "resurrectors" of old works on which
copyright had expired without renewal, like finders in the law of real
property, be allowed to obtain copyright in those works. We consider
that possibility later. For now, it is enough to observe that a system of
indefinite renewals would-depending on the fee, on whether group
renewals were permitted, and on the formalities involved in renewal-
somewhat mitigate the problem of incentives to invest in public-
domain works.
Another such problem is that a publisher would have an incen-
tive to make changes in any public domain work that he did revive,
since he could copyright the changes, but changes made merely to
stake a claim are socially inefficient. They may create private value for
the publisher, but from a social standpoint they impose higher real
33 This has been noted in connection with dolls and other goods portraying dead celebri-
ties. See Ronald Alsop, Items Portraying Dead Stars Produce Profits, Controversy, Wall St J 37
(May 10, 1984).
34 In other words,
a work's public domain status is far from an unqualified incentive for utilizing it.... Some
of the obvious concerns are whether a copyrighted derivative [work] will have to compete
with other, often low-budget, low quality copies and whether the producer of the copy-
righted derivative of a public domain work is likely to have anything unique in the long run.
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Term Extension: Boon for American Creators and the American
Economy, 45 J Copyright Socy USA 319,324 (1998).
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costs net of any value created by the publisher's changes. In other
words, extension of the copyright term might reduce socially excessive
product differentiation."
Conversely, if because of its age the novel were in need of an
elaborate scholarly apparatus, re-editing, or other costly additions to
make it readily accessible to a modern readership, publishers might be
reluctant to undertake the needed measures, even if they could copy-
right the scholarly apparatus (which they could not do to the extent it
was deemed a matter of ideas rather than expression), fearing that the
cost could not be recouped in the face of competition from cheap,
barebones editions of the novel. Reviewers might use the scholarly
apparatus, of course without compensation, to explain the book to the
public who would then buy the barebones edition.
Shakespeare comes to mind here, because the texts of his plays
are notably corrupt; also because it is uncertain that we have all the
texts of his plays and poems. There is a considerable industry in trying
to improve the accuracy of the texts and discover new works by
Shakespeare, but it is entirely academic. Despite Shakespeare's popu-
larity, there does not appear to be a significant commercial market for
the "maintenance" required to maximize the value of Shakespeare's
works.
A parallel example would be an old movie, on which copyright
had expired, that a studio wanted to issue in a colorized version that
would be very expensive to prepare. Promoting the colorized version
might increase the demand for the black and white version, a close
substitute for the colorized version. Since anyone could copy and sell
the black and white version, the studio considering colorization would
not take into account, in deciding whether to colorize, the increase in
demand for the black and white version. As a result, the expected
revenue from colorization might be less than the (private) costs and so
the movie studio would decide against it.n This is a good example of a
case in which indefinite renewal might be a complete solution, since,
given the public's avidity for movies old as well as new, an old movie
35 Two qualifications should be noted. One is that the publisher's changes in the public
domain work may be too slight to support a copyright in the derivative work. See L. Batlin &
Son, Inc v Snyder, 536 F2d 486,491 (2d Cir 1976) (en banc) (holding that to support a copyright
in a derivative work based on a public domain work "there must be at least some substantial
variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a different me-
dium"). The other qualification is that even if the publisher can copyright the derivative work, a
third party can copy the underlying public domain work from the derivative work without in-
fringing the copyright. See, for example, Feist Publications, Inc v Rural Telephone Service, 499 US
340,359 (1991) (stating that copyright in a compilation has no effect on the public domain status
of the pre-existing underlying material).
36 The implication of this point-that colorization is less likely for movies in the public
domain than for those still under copyright-is empirically testable.
[70:471
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright
would be quite likely to retain enough value to warrant the expense of
renewal.
The essential points are illustrated by the copyright on Mickey
Mouse. First, the character has changed in appearance over the years
since it was first created, 37 indicating continued investment after the
initial creation of the copyrighted work. Second, should the copyright
be fated to expire, Disney would have an incentive before expiration
to change the character further so that, by copyrighting the changes, it
might impede imitations. A further complication is that Mickey Mouse
is a Disney trademark, and trademarks have no fixed expiration date.
After the copyright expired, copiers would still need to disclaim a
Disney origin in order to avoid trademark infringement; such dis-
claimers, like conspicuous notices on paintings, might in some in-
stances impair the commercial value of the copy.
These examples, unlike the analysis of publicity rights and our ex-
tension of that analysis to copyright, show that a case against a defi-
nite time limit for copyrights can be based on the traditional incen-
tive-based argument for property rights, though with a new twist. The
new twist is recognition that the need to invest in intellectual property
to maximize its value is not exhausted in the initial creation of the
property. Investment is necessary to maintain the value of the prop-
erty as well, and also to resurrect abandoned or otherwise unexploited
intellectual property.39
Magnitudes are critical, and in the absence of them only tentative
conclusions are possible.4 The reader should recall, however, the theo-
37 For a long time, the changes were in the direction of making Mickey distinctly more
youthful in appearance. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural
History 95-107 (Norton 1980) (providing a graphic on Mickey's evolution). Recently, however,
we learn that "Mickey Mouse is getting a makeover, along with other familiar Disney cartoon
characters. No more cutesy, innocuous, not-a-care-in-the-world pet mouse. The 70-year-old char-
acter is about to become more in tune with his true rodency, the edgier times, and become a har-
ried, 1990s creature." Richard L. Eldredge, Peach Buzz: Will Some Man Please Call Tyra?;
Mickey, Minnie to Cop Edgy Attitude, Atlanta J & Const 2D (Apr 7,1998).
38 Indeed, Mickey's "primary role today is as the corporate logo of the [Walt Disney] com-
pany." Wasko, Understanding Disney at 125 (cited in note 25).
39 This is not an entirely novel point.
For a work to be commercially successful, it requires effort and investment which, while not
"creative," is still necessary to generate value. For example, authors employ literary agents,
publishers advertise, etc. With musical compositions and photographs, the collection, ar-
rangement and indexing of the works adds value. With film, preservation requires constant
attention. Even the straightforward act of printing a book entails a risk on investment. Ar-
guably, none of these activities will be pursued as vigorously on behalf of public domain
works as they are for works with ownership rights. And, from an economic point of view,
these activities "create" real value.
Edward Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values 4 (Congressional
Research Service May 11, 1998).
40 Rappaport states that the effect he describes "may be important in some cases but, we
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retical reasons to doubt that the extension of the copyright term via
renewals is likely to impose large tracing, transaction, or deadweight
costs, provided that copyrights already existing when the system of re-
newals is adopted are not eligible to be renewed, since extensions of
existing copyrights, as we noted, can impose very large deadweight
costs. On the other side of the balance, besides the unknown signifi-
cance of congestion externalities in the copyright context, we are told
that the Disney corporation has spent tens of millions of dollars refur-
bishing Mickey Mouse, both by subtle alterations in the character and
by situating it in carefully selected entertainment contexts in an effort
to increase the appeal of Mickey Mouse to the current generation of
young children, who apparently have diminished interest in him. The
incentive to make such expenditures would be impaired if the copy-
right expired, allowing anyone to use the character, though the copier
could not copy any newly copyrightable features that Disney had
added to the original character." At the same time, however, extending
the Mickey Mouse copyright, a highly valuable existing copyright,
would be likely to impose substantial deadweight costs, which might
well exceed the incentive-promoting and congestion-reducing benefits
that we have identified.
We conjecture that the reason so few classical composers are re-
corded and performed is that it is more costly to produce a musical
composition than it is, say, to photograph a painting. The recording
company that discovered and revived the works of a forgotten or ob-
scure composer would be risking a substantial amount of money in an
uncertain venture that could be imitated if successful. Much less ex-
pense would be involved in publishing a book, or even arranging an
exhibition of works of a forgotten or obscure painter. The absence of
property rights in the music of well-known classical composers may
also explain another feature of the recording industry. Many different
recording companies record the same public domain works of Bee-
thoven, Mozart, Bach, and other well-known composers. Recording
believe, will more often be marginal." Id. But he does not explain the reasoning or evidence that
leads him to this conclusion.
41 The public legislative history of the Sonny Bono Act says little about the twenty-year
addition to the duration of copyrights on works for hire, such as the Disney copyrights. The main
rationale given for the extension for individuals (remember that the Act extended the term for
individuals from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years) is (1) balance of payments and (2)
the fact that people are living longer (Irving Berlin being a pertinent example). The second point
makes very little sense, since an increase in longevity will automatically increase the length of the
copyright term measured from the author's death, unless the concern is with the longevity of his
heirs The first point is mercantilist, reflecting the fact that the United States is a net exporter of
intellectual property. One of the committee reports does, however, explain that the extension of
the copyright term "will provide the important collateral benefit of creating incentives to pre-
serve existing works." Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, S Rep No 104-315, 104th Cong, 2d
Sess 13 (1996). This is a point similar to our colorization example.
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companies differentiate their product by promoting the performer or
artist who has signed an exclusive contract with the company. Because
the recording company can, for example, copyright the Chicago Sym-
phony Orchestra's recording of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, it has an
incentive to promote that version; it has little incentive to promote the
public domain work of an unknown composer, since it could not ap-
propriate the benefits of those promotional efforts.
Consider also the effect on the recording of a composer's obscure
works when his copyrights expire. Our analysis implies that upon the
expiration of Puccini's copyrights, the rate at which his obscure works
were recorded fell relative to recordings of the best-known works,
since an investment in creating a demand for the obscure works would
be more difficult to recoup once the works were no longer under
copyright.
If our analysis is correct, Lawrence Lessig's criticism of the retro-
active extension of the Mickey Mouse copyright 2 overlooks important
though, in the present state of knowledge, inconclusive economic ar-
guments for extended copyright protection that are independent of
whether the protection is extended ex ante or ex post." Though, as wehave seen, ex post extension involves greater deadweight costs but
lower rent-seeking costs. If the method of extension were periodic re-
newal, then, since Congress could cut off the right of renewal at any
time, a law authorizing renewals without limit would be less vulner-
able to a constitutional challenge than a grant of perpetual copyright
ab initio-the latter being flatly inconsistent with granting a copyright
for "limited Times." Periodic renewal would also have the superior
economizing properties that we have emphasized.
But it would not address the case in which intellectual property
that has fallen into the public domain by abandonment is sought to be
revived. Suppose Tobias Smollett had copyrighted his books but after
a few renewals his heirs had decided the books had no value and so
declined to pay the renewal fee. Our analysis implies that a publisher
who wants to publish Smollett's books today should be permitted to
take out copyright on them, by analogy to the rule that allows finders
to obtain title to abandoned (as distinct from merely misplaced) prop-
42 See references to these and other retroactive extensions in Lawrence Lessig, The Future
of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 107 (Random House 2001):
More disturbingly, we have come to this expanded term through an increasingly familiar
practice in Congress of extending the term of copyright both prospectively (to works not
yet created) and retrospectively (to works created and still under copyright) .... Each time,
it is said, with only a bit of exaggeration, that Mickey Mouse is about to fall into the public
domain, the term of copyright for Mickey Mouse is extended.
43 See id at 197-98 ("[I]ncentives are prospective. Whatever we promise Hawthorne, he
isn't going to produce any more work.").
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erty. Unfortunately, the efficient implementation of such a rule is con-
siderably more complicated in the case of intellectual than of physical
property. In the latter case, allowing abandoned property to be with-
drawn from the public domain unproblematically implements the pol-
icy that valuable property should be owned in order to create the cor-
rect incentives for its exploitation. But imagine a "finder" of intellec-
tual property who claimed to have found, and who sought to obtain
copyright in and register, all the books in the British Library on which
copyright had expired. Such a claim, if honored, would be tantamount
to "banking" trademarks by simply listing all possible combinations of
the letters of the alphabet, and would create the rent-seeking and
transaction-cost problems that we have elsewhere discussed in the
trademark context."
The problem may not be insoluble. One way to deal with it would
be to limit the acquisition of copyright in previously created works to
works created after the law authorizing such acquisition was passed.
Another would be to require the publication of such a work within a
specified period of time after copyright was claimed in it. Another
would be to charge a stiff fee for registering such a copyright.
We have yet to consider an important though not fatal objection
both to indefinite renewals and to allowing even limited copyright
protection for "found" public domain works. These measures, as we
have seen, would create incentives for firms to expend resources on
discovering and disseminating obscure public domain works and on
maintaining consumer interest in copyrighted works that were about
to fall into the public domain (the Mickey Mouse example). But these
are not expenditures on creating expressive works; they are marketing
expenditures, which are not within the traditional domain of intellec-
tual-property law. Why should a particular subset of such expenditures
be singled out for legal protection? Firms that introduce wine and ci-
gar bars, develop movies about wars in outer space, recognize the po-
tential for health clubs that combine workout and social activities, or
introduce baggy trousers or pastel colors for clothing cannot prevent
other firms from imitating their marketing innovations. Trademark law
may prevent confusingly close imitation and copyright law may pro-
tect particular advertising slogans, but these laws do not prevent com-
petitors from free riding on the readily available information devel-
oped by the innovators.
44 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J L & Econ 265,281-83 (1987) ("[T]he ownership of a vast number of [trademarks], and
the aggregate licensing revenues that such ownership would command, would be a magnet draw-
ing resources into the activity of creating brand names, probably beyond the optimal level of
such investment.").
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However, there are at least three possible economic reasons for
singling out the particular marketing expenditures in issue for protec-
tion by copyright law. First, the distinction between expressive works
and the marketing of those works is overdrawn. Consider a record
company that develops, promotes, and distributes new pop records. A
few of them will be financial successes but the others will lose money.
Which will be hits and which will be flops is not known in advance. In
the absence of copyright protection-and here we are speaking just of
protection against the copying of the sound recordings themselves-
unauthorized copying of the hit records will drive their price down to
their cost of manufacture and distribution and leave nothing for cov-
ering the costs incurred in developing and promoting recordings of
new songs and new performers. Copyright protection enables the re-
cord company to earn enough money on the hits to cover both their
costs and the production and marketing costs of the many failures. In
effect, copyright indirectly prevents free riding on marketing and in-
formation expenditures that are similar to the expenditures incurred
in rediscovering obscure public domain works and in maintaining in-
terest in soon-to-expire copyrighted works.' To state this another way,
exploring the market for expressive works, the sort of exploration that
the measures we are discussing would encourage, is a stage in the crea-
tion of intellectual property.
Second, marketing expenditures associated with expressive works
differ from those associated with the other examples of new products
given above (wine and cigar bars, health clubs, and so forth) because it
is easier in the former case to identify the innovator. Many people
could probably make credible claims of being the first to come up
with the idea of baggy pants or pastel shades of clothing or combining
exercise and social opportunities under the same roof. Having the le-
gal system try to sort out these competing claims would involve sub-
stantial costs that would usually be avoided when someone was seek-
ing to restore a copyright in an obscure public domain work and
would never arise when one was seeking merely to renew an existing
copyright.
Third, many new business ideas may now be legally protectable
by "business method" patents. Such protection often provides incen-
tives for firms to invest in marketing and promotion that would be
subject to free riding in the absence of protection.
45 This concern is explicit in the Copyright Act of 1976 § 303, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat
2541, 2573, codified as amended at 17 USC § 303(a) (2000), which discourages free riding on
marketing and promotion expenditures of previously unpublished works about to fall into the
public domain by conditioning an additional forty-five years of protection on publication. Thus,
copyright on works unpublished on January 1, 1978, continues until December 31, 2002, but if
published by that date, protection continues until December 31, 2047.
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS
AND RENEWALS
Data on copyright registrations and renewals during the past one
hundred years bear directly on the subject of this Article. If it turned
out that all or most copyrighted works created before the 1976 Copy-
right Act (which became effective on July 1, 1978) were renewed, the
implication would be that a system of indefinite renewals might ap-
proach perpetual copyright, though this would also depend on how
steep the renewal fee was. Conversely, if renewals are infrequent even
46
under the current system of nominal fees, then probably only a rela-
tively few highly valuable works would remain under copyright be-
yond the initial term even if indefinite renewals were permitted.
A. The Data
The U.S. Copyright Office publishes data on registrations and re-
newals. 7 Although the number of registrations is only a proxy for the
number of copyrighted works because registration has always been
optional, the 1909 and 1976 copyright acts created strong incentives to
register a copyright and to register it promptly. Not only is registration
(or, under the 1976 Act, an application to register) a prerequisite for
filing a suit for infringement,8 but it must be done before the in-
fringement (or within three months of first publication) if the copy-
right holder wants to recover statutory damages and attorney's fees.9
As noted earlier, the 1909 Act fixed the copyright term at twenty-eight
years from the date of first publication (or, for works that were copy-
righted but not published, from the date of registration), and at the
end of the term the copyright could be renewed for an additional
twenty-eight years (effectively raised to forty-seven years in 1962 and
46 See note 10.
47 See Copyright Office, Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights (Library of Congress,
various years) (individual reports cited in note 6). See also Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copy-
right, in Copyright Society of the USA, ed, 1 Studies on Copyright: Arthur Fisher Memorial Edi-
tion 503,616-20 (Rothman & Co and Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (analyzing Copyright Office renewal
data by class of original registration, percentage of works copyrighted, and category of renewal
claimant).
48 See 17 USC § 411(a) (2000) ("[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title."). Under the Beme Convention Implementation Act of 1988 § 9, Pub
L No 100-568, 102 Stat 2853, 2859, codified as amended at 17 USC § 411(a), the registration re-
quirement only applies to a "United States work" -in other words, a work first published in the
United States or where the author is a United States national or lives here. See 17 USC § 101
(2000) (distinguishing between a "Berne Convention work" and a "United States work").
49 See 17 USC § 412 (2000) ("[N]o award of statutory damages or of attorney's fees ...
shall be made for ... any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the
work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within
three months after the first publication of the work.").
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to sixty-seven years in October 1998) if the copyright holder applied
for renewal within the last year of the initial term. " Beginning in 1992
renewal became automatic,"1 so renewal registrations were sure to de-
cline after that, but not to zero because there was still an incentive to
file, mainly because a renewal registration is prima facie evidence of
the validity of the copyright during its extended term and of the facts
stated in the certificate of renewal. Another important change in the
law was the extension of federal protection by the 1976 Act from pub-
lished works to all works fixed in a tangible medium, whether or not
they are published. This change could be expected to have increased
the number of registrations without any increase in the output of
copyrightable works.
Our primary focus is on renewals because they allow us to esti-
mate the expected economic life of a copyright. 2 But we need data on
registration as well because the number of initial registrations deter-
mines the number of works that are potentially renewable twenty-
eight years later. For example, works renewed in 1938 were registered
initially in 1910. To obtain the number of 1910 registrations, however,
we have to deduct renewal registrations in 1910 (from works first
copyrighted in 1882) because the Copyright Office includes renewal
registrations in its tabulation of registrations.
B. Copyright Registrations and Renewals
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate registrations, renewals, and the re-
newal/registration ratio, respectively, over the past century; the re-
newal/registration ratio in year t being simply the number of renewals
in t divided by the number of initial registrations in t-28.
50 See note 4 and accompanying text.
51 Remember that these are renewals of copyrights that date from before the effective date
of the 1976 Copyright Act, which gave the copyright owner a nonrenewable term of life plus fifty
(later seventy) years. See text accompanying note 5.
52 Economists have used patent application and renewal data to estimate the expected life
and distribution of patent values. For a summary of these studies, see Jean 0. Lanjouw, Ariel
Pakes, and Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of
Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J Indus Econ 405, 406-07 (1998) ("[Alpplication and
renewal data contain rather direct information on the value of the proprietary rights created by
patent laws and policy, that is, on the value of patent protection."). See also note 76.
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FIGURE 2
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Figures 2 and 3 reveal that copyright registrations and renewals
rose rapidly in the twentieth century, but that, as expected, renewals
began to decline in 1992 when they became automatic.13 The rise
doubtlessly reflects an increase in the number of copyrightable works
brought about by growth in the output of expressive activities, as well
as reflecting changes in the copyright law. Why, then, did both registra-
tions and renewals peak in 1991, declining by almost 20 percent by
53 Recall that the Act of Mar 4, 1909 § 23, 35 Stat 1075, 1080 (effective July 1, 1909) ex-
tended the renewal term from fourteen to twenty-eight years. Works that had been renewed for
fourteen years in the period 1895 to 1909 were entitled to a further renewal of fourteen years, for
a total renewal period of twenty-eight years. Id at § 24, 35 Stat at 1080-81. We do not include the
fourteen-year extensions in our count of renewals in the 1910 to 1923 period. Our analysis of re-
newal data begins with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910, the first fiscal year of the 1909 Act.
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2000, with the decline concentrated in the last year? The answer may
be, in part anyway, that the registration fee was doubled in 1991, from
$10 to $20, and increased again in 2000, to $30, while the renewal fee
was doubled to $12 in 1991, rose to $20 in 1993, and more than dou-
bled, to $45, in 2000. Although these fees seem small in relation to the
inconvenience of registering and complying with other requirements
of registration, such as submission of a copy of the work to the Copy-
right Office," Figures 2 and 3 suggest substantial negative responses to
higher fees for both original and renewal registrations. The effect on
renewals is more ambiguous, of course, because of the automatic re-
newal amendment in 1992-although the amendment did not elimi-
nate all incentive to register a renewal, since by doing so a copyright
holder could recapture rights in already created derivative works.
FIGURE 4
RATIO OF RENEWALS IN tTO REGISTRATIONS IN t-28
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As Figure 4 shows, the fraction of works renewed increased sig-
nificantly between 1910 and 1991, then plummeted -no doubt mainly
because of automatic renewal, though higher fees may also have
played a role." Prior to 1992 (the first fiscal year for automatic re-
54 Another reason for the decline in registrations may be that since March 1989, registra-
tion has no longer been a condition for bringing an infringement suit for foreign works protected
by the Berne Convention and the World Trade Organization, though it remains a prerequisite for
seeking statutory damages and attorneys fees. The fact has little quantitative importance, how-
ever, because foreign works are only a small fraction of copyright registrations. See text
accompanying note 59.
55 We analyze the impact of fee changes in the regression analysis below, see text accom-
panying note 68, but point out here that it would be a mistake to think that the ratio of renewals
to registrations should not change in response to higher fees for both renewals and registrations.
The mistake lies in failing to note that the ratio of renewals to registrations is calculated from
renewals in year t and registrations in year t-28, and obviously an increase in fees in 1991 could
not affect the number of registrations in 1963, the denominator in the 1991 ratio. The only effect
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newal), renewal rates ranged from a low of .03 in 1914 to a high of .22
in 1991. Although the full cost of renewal includes both a small re-
newal fee and the monetary equivalent (probably small) of the
16inconvenience and other costs associated with renewal, the fact that a
small fraction of works are renewed implies that most copyrights have
very little economic value after twenty-eight years. Put differently, the
decision to renew a copyright depends upon a comparison of the dis-
counted value of the expected future revenues from the copyright
compared to the full costs of renewal. If the latter exceeds the former,
the copyright will not be renewed. Since only a small fraction of works
are renewed, it follows that the expected economic value of the 80
percent or so of copyrighted works that are not renewed is less than
the small cost of renewal.
Of course, we cannot dismiss the possibility that some fraction of
nonrenewals are due to simple oversight, or careless failure to comply
with required formalities. Nonrenewals by corporations or other own-
ers of works for hire might therefore be a better index of decisions not
to renew based on lack of commercial value; but we do not have those
data.
If, as both the raw data in Figures 2 and 3 and the regression
analysis indicate, registrations and renewals respond significantly to
modest changes in fees, it is likely that: (1) the size of the public do-
main will expand under a system of indefinite renewals compared to
the present copyright system; (2) the average value of works in the
public domain will decline under a system of indefinite renewals; (3)
the expected economic life of most copyrighted works is short;57 and
(4) a system of indefinite renewals, at least if limited to works copy-
righted after the system is created, will separate valuable works in
which continued copyright protection may be socially efficient from
works in which the cost of continuing that protection almost certainly
exceeds the sum of administrative and access (including transaction)
costs.
of higher fees on that ratio would come through the effect of a higher renewal fee on the number
of renewals that year. Note also that the renewal ratio in Figure 4 is biased downward from 1910
to 1937 because registrations data from 1881 to 1909 include both new registrations and four-
teen-year renewal registrations (from works first registered in 1867 to 1895). We account for this
bias in our regression analysis.
56 As noted earlier, the full cost of renewal for a person seeking to renew a group of sepa-
rate works-say, photographs-would be substantial, provided the law required a separate re-
newal fee for each photograph. See note 10.
57 The actual life of some of these works is longer; an author may err in his estimate of the
demand for his work and therefore fail to renew his copyright, though in fact the work has con-
tinued value.
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C. Depreciation and the Economic Life of Copyrights
Depreciation rates of copyrighted material can be calculated
from data on renewals and registrations. Initial registrations constitute
one year's stock of copyrighted works. Renewal registrations of those
works constitute a different, smaller stock of the same works twenty-
eight years later (renewals must be registered in the last year of the
initial term). The annual rate at which the first stock shrinks to be-
come the second is the depreciation rate of the first stock. That rate is
given by REN, = (REG,.)e 8 28 where REN, denotes renewals in t of
works registered twenty-eight years earlier (=REG,.,) and 5 equals
the annual average depreciation rate for copyrights registered in pe-
riod t-28. Figure 5 depicts annual depreciation rates, measured in year
t, of works registered twenty-eight years earlier. Thus, the depreciation
rate of .054 in 1990 (5.4 percent) is the annual depreciation rate of
works registered in 1962. The higher the renewal ratio, of course, the
lower the depreciation rate, since we are computing the depreciation
rate from the fraction of copyrighted works that are renewed.
Figure 5 indicates that the average annual depreciation rate of
copyrighted works has ranged from a low of 5.4 percent in 1990 to a
high of 12.2 percent in 1914 (for works first registered in 1886), with
the overall average being 8.3 percent.% The long-term trend (setting to
one side the effect, beginning in 1992, of automatic renewal) is toward
lower depreciation, implying that copyrightable works have become
more valuable. One reason may be the increase, beginning in 1962, in
the renewal term from twenty-eight to forty-seven years, which in-
creased the present value of copyrights by extending their potential
term. But given discounting, the effect should not have been great, and
so it is not surprising that most of the decline in the depreciation rate
occurred before 1962.
Why there was any decline in depreciation is unclear, however.
Even if the demand for copyrightable works has been growing, the
supply of new works would be expected to respond at roughly the
same rate in order to keep the real value of copyrights roughly con-
stant. One possible reason for the decline in depreciation is that new
technologies, such as long-playing records, stereo equipment, radio,
and television, have extended the economic life of copyrights. For ex-
ample, the growth in demand for prerecorded music made possible by
technological advances such as radio and television broadcasting,
high-quality home stereo systems, and even the automobile (which in-
creases the number of people listening to radio) should have in-
58 As noted earlier, estimates of depreciation for the years 1910 to 1937 are biased down-
ward because registration data in the period 1882 to 1909 include renewal registrations. See note
55.
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creased the overall demand for copyrighted music. Some of this de-
mand would be satisfied by older though still copyrighted music, re-
sulting in higher renewal rates and hence a lower depreciation rate.
FIGURE 5
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION OF REGISTERED COPYRIGHTS
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Here we should mention a complication arising from the fact that
as a result of the signing of the Berne Convention by the United
States, copyright protection was restored for a number of works that
were protected in their country of origin but had fallen into the public
domain in this country, mainly because of failure to comply with the
requirements of notice or renewal. This has two potential effects on
the calculation of depreciation. First, if foreign works were less likely
to be renewed (or more likely to fall into the public domain because
of improper notice) than U.S. works, depreciation of the latter would
be lower than shown in Figure 5. Second, the size of the public domain
would be smaller today. These effects are likely to have only a negligi-
ble impact on our empirical analysis, however, because we estimate
that foreign works constitute only between 1 and 5 percent of copy-
right registrations."
The reciprocal of depreciation is the average expected life of a
copyrighted work. Although the statutory term of copyrighted works
first published in the period 1881 through 1972 and renewed for a sec-
ond term varied from fifty-six to ninety-five years, the commercial life
(=1/8) of the average copyrighted work was much lower, ranging from
8.19 years to 18.5 years for works first registered in 1886 and 1962, re-
spectively. In the first group, 3.3 percent were renewed (in 1914); in
the second, 22 percent were renewed (1990).
59 We were able to obtain data on foreign registrations for only some of the years between
1961 and 1977, however.
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It is also possible to estimate the number of works registered in
1934 that retain commercial value today. We chose that year because
works first published then could be renewed for forty-seven years in
1962, and another twenty years were tacked on in 1998, so that a copy-
right first registered in 1934 need not enter the public domain until
2029. Yet the estimated depreciation rate of works registered in 1934
is .07, implying that of the works registered that year, 50 percent had
fully depreciated by 1944, 90 percent by 1977, and 99 percent by 2000;
fewer than 1 in 750 works registered in 1934 will have commercial
value in 2030. Had renewals been permitted every five or ten years,
then after an initial term of twenty or so years, about 99 percent of the
works registered in 1934 would have fallen into the public domain by
the year 2000, because by then their commercial value had fallen be-
low the cost and inconvenience of renewal. Of course, the 1 percent
that would still be under copyright would mainly be the more valuable
and enduring works.
D. Depreciation Rates for Books, Music, and Graphic Arts
The Copyright Office publishes separate data on registrations
and renewals for books (including pamphlets-which indeed account
for 80 percent of the category), music, and graphic arts (applied art,
posters, fine arts, labels, photographs, technical drawings, and maps).
As shown in Figure 6, the time trend of these three categories closely
tracks the time trend of overall registrations (the correlation is .99).
This is not surprising, because these categories account for 70 percent
of all registrations.
i '
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FIGURE 6
REGISTRATIONS OF ALL COPYRIGHTS, BOOKS,
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In Figure 7 we see that the number of musical copyrights has
grown the fastest, the number of book copyrights the second fastest,
and graphic arts the slowest. We estimated simple regressions of the
form log y, = a + rt + u, where y denotes either book, music, or graphic
art registrations, t, time, and u, the residual. The coefficient r, which
measures the rate of growth per year, equaled .021 (24.5) for books,
.025 (41.5) for music, and .014 (7.44) for graphic arts. The t-statistics(in parentheses) indicate that these growth rates are highly signifi-
cant.' ° The differences in growth rates between any two of the three
categories are also statistically significant.
60 However, books include periodicals for the 1909-26 period, which artificially increases
the number of book registrations in that period and so lowers the estimated rate of growth. If we
estimate the growth rate from 1927 (rather than 1909) to 2000, the coefficients (and t-statistics)
on r are .024 (27.4) for books, .026 (33.3) for music, and .022 (12.8) for graphic arts. Although the
growth rates for books and music are much closer, all differences remain statistically significant
at the .10 level.
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FIGURE 7
SEPARATE REGISTRATIONS FOR BOOKS, MUSIC,
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We can also link up renewals with registrations for each of the
three categories to estimate category-specific depreciation rates,
though since the earliest category-specific registration data we have
are for 1909, we can only use renewal data starting in 1937. Figures 8
and 9 graph the renewal ratio and depreciation rates.
FIGURE 8
THE RATIO OF RENEWALS IN t TO REGISTRATIONS IN t-28
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FIGURE 9
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Notice that only about 3 percent of graphic-arts works were re-
newed after twenty-eight years, compared to 8 percent for books and
32 percent for music, which peaked at more than 40 percent for works
renewed in 1944 and 1956. Music renewal rates have been falling
sharply since 1956, while book renewal rates have been rising during
this period, so that by 1969 renewal rates were greater for books than
music for works first copyrighted in 1942. By the same token, depre-
ciation rates are highest for graphic arts (averaging about 14 percent)
and lowest for music (about 4 percent), with books in the middle(about 9 percent).61 We also observe declining depreciation rates for
both books and graphic arts, while depreciation of music began to in-
crease in the mid-1950s and by 1969 was just slightly below that of
books.
What explains these differences? The graphic-arts category is
dominated by commercial art, such as advertising layouts and fabric
designs for fashion items, the useful life of which tends to be no longer
than the advertising campaign or latest fashion season. (Mickey
Mouse is a dramatic exception.) At the other extreme, music written
for one use can have many other uses in the future. For example, a
song written for a Broadway show might be recorded by many differ-
ent artists over a long period of time or be used as background music
61 We noted earlier that of 10,027 books published in 1930, only 174 were still in print in
2001. See text accompanying note 11. An annual depreciation rate of 5.7 percent would produce
this more than fifty-fold decline. From our data, we estimate a depreciation rate of 8.9 percent
for books registered in 1930, but this is the average rate over the period 1930 to 1958 (the date of
renewal). Overall, the depreciation rate is 9.2 percent for books registered between 1909 and
1941. The probable explanation for the discrepancy between this rate and the 5.7 percent esti-
mate is the fact, noted in the text, that the book category in our data includes pamphlets and
leaflets, which tend to be ephemeral.
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in a movie or a television program.- In addition, music is less tied to
cultural change than purely verbal works, which are often extremely
topical and therefore depreciate rapidly. Books are more enduring
than most applied art if only because the costs of storing them is rela-
tively low and there is some chance of turning a book into a movie or
rekindling interest in the author.
Whatever the reasons for the differences in depreciation rates
across these categories, the differences bolster the case for indefinite
renewals. Current copyright law does not differentiate among differ-
ent types of work. All copyrightable works, from computer programs
to novels to installation art (which is typically site-specific so that the
tangible work lasts only the length of the exhibition), have the identi-
cal term despite the large differences in commercial life expectancy. A
system of indefinite renewals would automatically distinguish the en-
during from the ephemeral. Most works of graphic art probably would
not be renewed even if the initial term were only five years. Because
books and music are likely to have more lasting value, their renewal
rates would be greater. We have seen that it may be socially beneficial
to continue property rights in - and only in - intellectual property that
retains sufficient value to offset access and administrative costs, be-
cause of the investment disincentives and congestion externalities that
are likely to result when valuable property is unowned.
E. Regression Analysis
We can use multiple regression analysis to estimate the impact on
registrations and renewals of changes in fees, statutory changes in
copyright law, and changes in the underlying demand for expressive
works. Tables 1 (registrations) and 2 (renewals) present the results of
our regression analysis, which provide additional insight into the likely
effects of a system of indefinite renewals.
The dependent variable in Table 1 is the logarithm of the annual
number of registrations in the period 1910 to 2000. We present both
OLS (ordinary least squares) and Cochrane-Orcutt estimates (the lat-
ter to correct for significant autocorrelation). The independent vari-
ables in equations (1.1) and (1.2) are a time trend (Year), the copy-
right registration or renewal fee (LogFee) deflated by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), the expected copyright duration (LogE(Life))
computed from our estimates of depreciation, and annual recreation
expenditure (LogRecExp) that are a proxy for the demand for expres-
-62 See Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension at 3 n 5 (cited in note 39) (remarking that "in
the case of music.... its 'timeless' quality allows themes to be recycled endlessly"). Notice, how-
ever, that depreciation rates of music rose in the 1956 to 1969 period, suggesting that more recent
popular music is less durable than works created in the 1920s and earlier.
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sive (and thus often copyrighted) works of music, movies, books, and
periodicals,63 also deflated by the CPI. The registration, fee, duration,
and recreational-expenditure variables are in log form; their regres-
sion coefficients are therefore elasticities. Equations (1.3) and (1.4)
add several dummy variables denoting changes in the copyright stat-
ute that are likely to effect the number of registrations. These include
the 1962 amendment extending the renewal term to forty-seven years
(1962RenExt), the extension of copyright protection to sound re-
cordings in 1972 (1972Sound), the 1976 Copyright Act, effective in
1978 (1976Act), the 1988 ratification of the Berne Convention effec-
tive in 1989 (1988Berne)" and the 1998 (Sonny Bono) Copyright Term
Extension Act (1998BonoExt), which added twenty years to the copy-
right term. These variables take a value of 1 for all years in which the
given change is in effect and of 0 otherwise.
All four equations reveal a significant growth rate of copyright
registrations of about 1 to 2 percent per year. The time trend variable
(Year) picks up increases in population, income, wealth, and education
that are positively correlated with time over the ninety-year period
covered by our data and are likely to increase the demand for expres-
sive activities. A positive time trend was visible in Figure 2, but regres-
sion analysis enables us to conclude that the trend is the result of (or
at least is positively correlated with) an increase in the underlying
growth in demand for expressive activities rather than of changes in
fees, the law, or other policy variables. Although the regression coeffi-
cients on recreation expenditures are positive in all the equations in
Table 1, only the OLS estimates (equations (1.1) and (1.3)) are statis-
tically significant.
The most interesting result in Table 1 is the negative and highly
significant effect of registration fees (t-statistics between 4.6 and 9.1)
on registrations. The coefficients on fees yield a negative elasticity of
around .20, implying that a 25 percent increase in fees would reduce
copyright registrations by more than 5 percent, even though fees are
very small. (For example, the registration fee in 2000 was only $30, and
it had averaged only $20.48 in 2000 dollars over the 1910 to 2000 pe-
riod.) The implication is that most copyrights have negligible expected
value, because even very small increases in already very low fees deter
63 We estimate that expenditures on expressive goods account for about 50 percent of the
recreation category.
64 The Copyright Act was amended in 1988 (effective in March 1989) to comply with the
substantive provisions of the Berne Convention. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, 102 Stat 2853, codified as amended in various sections of title 17 (2000). The most signifi-
cant amendment was to make copyright notice optional. See id at § 7, 102 Stat at 2857-58,
amending 17 USC § 401(a) ("[A] notice of copyright as provided by this section may [changed
from "shall"] be placed on publicly distributed [copies]....") and § 402(a) (same).
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many owners of intellectual property from seeking to register it. While
registration is now optional rather than a precondition of obtaining a
copyright, it confers procedural advantages that should motivate any
copyright holder who thinks his work retains significant commercial
value to register his copyright.
The number of registrations is also highly responsive to the ex-
pected commercial life (LogE(Life)) of a work, which for all but a few
works is shorter than the statutory copyright term. For example, a 10
percent increase in that expected life leads, other things being equal,
to a 3.2 percent increase in registrations in equation (1.4), and this ef-
fect is highly significant statistically.
61
Of the remaining variables, only the 1976 Copyright Act and 1988
Berne Convention dummy variables have statistically significant ef-
fects on registrations after we adjust for autocorrelation. Extending
the renewal term in 1962 and adding sound recordings to the Copy-
right Act in 1972 have positive and significant effects on registrations
in the OLS but not in the Cochrane-Orcutt estimates. It is not surpris-
ing that the term-extension variables (in 1962 and 1998) are insignifi-
cant, because the expected commercial life of a copyrighted work is so
much shorter than the copyright term, making an increase in the term
irrelevant to most potential registrants. Amendments to the Copyright
Act that accompanied ratification of the Berne Convention are asso-
ciated with about a 10 percent increase in registrations. These amend-
ments (for example, notice and the need to record some transfers and
licenses became optional) effectively lowered the full cost (including
inconvenience costs) of registration, which in turn should increase the
number of registrations."
65 The only exception to the significant effect of LogE(Life) is equation (1.1). But the sig-
nificance of this equation in our analysis is marginal because it does not adjust for autocorrela-
tion and excludes five important statutory variables.
66 An offset, however, is that registration for Berne Convention and WTO works is no
longer a prerequisite to being able to sue for copyright infringement, though registration is still
required for certain remedies. See 17 USC § 412 (no award of statutory damages or attorney's
fees for non-registered works).
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TABLE I
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF REGISTRATIONS
(t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Independent Log Registrations
Variables OLS COREG OLS COREG
1 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Year
LogFee
LogE(Life)
LogRecExp
1962RenExt
1972Sound
1976Act
1988Berne
1998BonoExt
Constant
.013
(3.71)
-.31
(9.06)
.07
(.79)
.20
(2.49)
13.8
(2.43)
.018
(5.44)
-.24
(5.57)
.35
(3.79)
.03
(.50)
-24.1
(5.11)
.005
(1.88)
-.19
(5.93)
.37
(4.01)
.18
(2.56)
.08
(2.28)
.16
(3.80)
.07
(1.77)
.12
(2.86)
.02
(.27)
-.92
(.19)
.018
(4.78)
-.20
(4.67)
.35
(3.57)
.02
(.26)
.02
(.39)
.03
(.48)
-.14
(2.19)
.11
(1.86)
.06
(1.06)
-24.3
(3.47)
Durbin-Watson .50 2.25 .87 2.11
rho 
- .84 - .88
R2  .97 .72 .98 .66
No. Observations 90 89 90 89
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One puzzling result is that the 1976 Act seems, after correction
for other factors, to have reduced the number of copyright registra-
tions by about 14 percent. Since the Act eliminated common law
copyright and brought unpublished works under the federal statute,
one would have expected the number of registrations to increase. The
negative coefficient on the 1976 Act is the consequence of a sharp
drop in registrations in 1978 (the year the Act took effect)-from
more than 420,000 in 1977 to 310,742 in 1978, followed, however, by an
increase to more than 400,000 the following year. If equation (1.4) is
re-estimated treating fiscal year 1979 rather than fiscal year 1978 as
the first full year of the 1976 Act, the coefficient on the 1976Act vari-
able becomes positive and highly significant (.16 with a t-statistic of
3.08), indicating a 16 percent increase in registrations as a result of the
Act. There are no changes in the effect of the other variables when we
date fiscal year 1979 as the first year of the 1976 Act.
In Table 2 the dependent variable is the log of the number of re-
newals per year. Equation (2.1) presents OLS estimates and equation
(2.2) Cochrane-Orcutt estimates. Since renewals depend in part on the
number of works registered twenty-eight years earlier, we include two
registration variables-one for annual registrations from 1882-1910
and the other for annual registrations from 1911-1972-to account for
the fact that data on registrations included both new registrations and
renewal registrations through (most of fiscal year) 1910. We do not in-
clude variables for the 1972, 1976, 1988, and 1998 statutory amend-
ments, as we would not expect them to affect renewals, holding regis-
trations constant. For example, adding twenty years to the renewal
term in 1998 increased the expected value (though only slightly) of a
renewal but did not affect the incentive to renew because beginning in
1992 renewals had become automatic.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RENEWALS
(t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Independent Variables Log Renewals
OLS OREG
(2.1) (2.2)
Year
LogFee
LogReg,.2 1882-1910
LogReg,.J1911-1972
LogRecExp
1962RenExt
1992AutoRen
Constant
.018
(2.56)
-.09
(1.08)
.95
(10.34)
.99
(10.64)
-.02
(.14)
-.07
(.69)
-.64
(6.37)
-36.4
(3.10)
.023
(2:61)
-.22
(2.13)
.86
(5.18)
.89
(5.38)
-.12
(.67)
-.06
(.48)
-.47
(3.82)
-44.0
(2.99)
Durbin-Watson 1.08 2.12
rho 
- .55
R2  .98 .90
No. Observations 90 89
Table 2 indicates that renewals are highly responsive to registra-
tions twenty-eight years earlier. Not only are both regression coeffi-
cients highly significant, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients are both equal to one-that is, for each 1 percent increase
in registrations twenty-eight years earlier, renewals increased by 1
percent. As expected, the automatic renewal amendment in 1992 is
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statistically significant and indicates that renewals fell by about 50
percent after the amendment. Extending the renewal term from
twenty-eight to forty-seven years beginning in 1962 had no significant
effect on renewals, but this is not surprising. Consider the copyright
holder who has to decide whether to renew his copyright after expira-
tion of the initial term of twenty-eight years. Since the expected addi-
tional commercial life of such works is likely to be shorter than
twenty-eight years, adding nineteen years to the renewal period
should not significantly influence the decision whether to renew.
Turning to the Year variable, we find a statistically significant in-
crease in renewals of 2 percent per year (holding registrations eligible
for renewal constant). This is consistent with a long-term growth in the
demand for and hence in the value of expressive activities, since in re-
sponse to that growth copyright holders would have a greater incen-
tive to renew their copyrights. After adjusting for this upward trend,
we do not find any significant effect of recreation expenditures on re-
newals!"
Like initial registrations, renewals are responsive to changes in
fees. Although the coefficient on fees is not significant in equation
(2.1), autocorrelation in the OLS estimate produces standard errors
that are biased. Equation (2.2) corrects for this bias and reveals a sta-
tistically significant effect of fees on renewals: A 10 percent increase in
the inflation-adjusted renewal fee results in a 2.2 percent decrease in
the number of renewals."
F. Trademark Renewal Rates
Additional light is cast on our subject by considering renewal
rates for trademarks. A trademark has no fixed expiration date, but
maintaining a federally registered trademark (which like a registered
copyright confers procedural advantages) requires the owner to file an
affidavit during the sixth year after registration, and in every tenth
year, stating that the trademark is still in use, and he must also file a
renewal application every ten years.6' Prior to the Trademark Law Re-
vision Act of 1988 (effective November 16, 1989),"° registrations and
67 This result is expected since there is a .87 correlation between the logarithm of
recreation expenditures and Year.
68 The reason equations (2.1) and (2.2) do not include an independent variable for the ex-
pected life of a copyrighted work is that renewals are used to estimate depreciation and hence
expected duration, so that adding the log of expected duration to the right-hand side of the re-
gression equation would place the log of renewals for the same year on both sides of the equa-
tion.
69 15 USC § 1058 (2000) ("[Tlhe registrant shall file ... an affidavit setting forth those
goods or services recited in the registration on or in connection with which the mark is in use in
commerce.").
70 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 § 111, Pub L No 100-667, 102 Stat 3935,3939,
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renewals remained in force for twenty-year periods subject to the
owner's having to file an affidavit of continued use every ten years.7'
Thus, the Act reduced both the registration and the renewal periods to
ten years. Since there is no limit on the number of times a trademark
can be renewed, we have in trademark law a model for how a system
of indefinite copyright renewals might operate.
Since trademarks can be renewed indefinitely, renewals in period
t arise from (1) trademarks first registered in t-20 and (2) trademarks
registered initially in t-40, t-60, and so on that had been continuously
renewed (the last time in t-20) and are still in force at time t.72 Assum-
ing a constant rate of depreciation for trademarks in the interval t-20
to t, we have the following identity: REN, = (REG,.20 + REN,2 de °
where REN and REG denote renewals and registrations respectively, t
denotes time, and Jthe depreciation rate.
Figures 10 and 11 plot renewal and depreciation rates for trade-
marks from 1934 to 1999, the period for which we have data. Trade-
mark renewals averaged 27 percent, annual depreciation was 6.6 per-
cent, and the expected life (equal to the reciprocal of depreciation)
was 15.4 years. Trademark renewal rates and the average effective life
of a trademark are greater and depreciation lower than the corre-
sponding data for copyrights (see Figures 4 and 5). For an exact com-
parison, between 1934 and 1991 3 trademark renewals averaged 28
percent, depreciation was 6.4 percent, and the expected life was 15.7
years, while the corresponding figures for copyright renewals were 14
percent, 7.3 percent, and 14 years. Notice that although trademark re-
newal rates are double copyright renewal rates, the difference in de-
preciation and in life expectancy is less than 15 percent. The reason is
that during that era trademarks were renewed after twenty years but
copyrights after twenty-eight years. So we would observe substantially
higher renewal rates for trademarks than for copyrights even if
depreciation were the same.
codified as amended at 15 USC § 1059 (2000) ("each registration may be renewed for periods of
10 years at the end of each successive 10-year period").
71 For the law before the Trademark Law Revision Act, see Act of Oct 9, 1962 § 5, Pub L
No 87-772,76 Stat 769,770 (providing for a twenty-year period for each trademark renewal).
72 Since our renewal data run through the end of fiscal year 1999 (September 30, 1999),
slightly less than a decade after the Trademark Law Revision Act, 102 Stat 3935, went into effect,
all renewals in our sample come from trademarks that had been in force for at least twenty
years.
73 We use these dates because 1934 is the earliest year for which we are able to calculate
trademark renewal rates (which requires that we have renewals from 1914), and 1991 is the last
year for accurately estimating copyright renewals because renewals became automatic starting in
1992.
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FIGURE 10
THE RATIO OF TRADEMARK RENEWALS IN t TO REGISTRATIONS
RENEWALS IN t-20:1934-1999
930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Year
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FIGURE 11
DEPRECIATION IN t OF TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS AND
RENEWALS IN t-20:1934-1999
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We also regressed (in logs) trademark renewals in t on registra-
tions and renewals in t-20, a time trend (Year), and renewal fees ad-
justed for the CPI and GNP (LGNP) in logs for the period 1935 to
1999. Both registrations and renewals in t-20 have positive and highly
significant effects on renewals in t; renewal fees have a negative
though only marginally significant effect (t=1.74); and neither time nor
2003]
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GNP is significant. 7 It is not surprising that the estimated renewal
elasticity with respect to fees is relatively small (-.06) and only mar-
ginally significant, because there has been very little variation in
(nominal) registration fees over the past fifty years. Renewal fees
were $15 from 1935 to 1945, $25 from 1946 to 1981, were increased
sharply in the next two years (to $150 in 1982, and $300 in 1983), and
have remained at $300 since then. There is some evidence that trade-
mark renewal rates declined following the substantial fee increases in
1982 and 1983. Renewal rates averaged .27 in the five-year period of
1977-81 compared to .23 in the five-year period of 1984-88, when the
fees were much higher.
The reason depreciation is lower for trademarks than for copy-
rights is similar to the reason depreciation of copyrighted music is
lower than depreciation for books and graphic arts. Like music, a
trademark attached to a particular product or service can be extended
to new goods and services. A successful trademark embodies the good
will and reputation of the producer. Firms have an incentive to capi-
talize on this good will by introducing new and improved products
under the same brand name. The Ford Motor Company initially regis-
tered the "Ford" trademark in 1909 for automobiles and parts.7 Since
then, Ford has introduced hundreds of new automobiles under the
Ford name. Similarly, Bayer first registered its trademark in 1908 for
use on synthetic coal-tar remedies, and later placed the name on nu-
merous pharmaceutical products that did not exist in 1908.
This analysis suggests that the depreciation rate of trademarks is
likely to be lower than that of books and graphic arts but not that of
musical copyrights, which like trademarks have potential uses, for ex-
ample in new recordings, beyond their first use. (Of course, some
74 The regression equation (t-statistics in parentheses) is
LRen, = -4.30 + .72LReg,., + .14LRen,,_ - .005 Year + .06LFee,
(.66) (11.89) (6.05) (1.02) (1.74)
-.40LGNP + u
(1.45)
R' = .91 Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.80 n=65
The analysis also supports the assumption that the depreciation rates on registrations and
renewals in t-20 are equal. Since the ratio of renewals to registrations averages about .21 over the
1915-79 period (the relevant time period for the dependent variable, which runs from 1935 to
1999), equal depreciation rates imply that the renewal elasticity in the above regression should
be about 20 percent of the registration elasticity. This hypothesis is not rejected.
75 The Ford trademark was registered fourteen years after its first use in commerce (1895).
For information on Ford's, and other, trademarks, search the database of the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, online at http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (visited Feb 28,
2003).
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books do too-the novel Gone With the Wind, for example, was later
made into a very successful movie.) The data support this conjecture.
We find, for the period 1934 to 1991, depreciation rates of 13.4 percent
for graphic arts, 9.2 percent for books, 6.5 percent for trademarks, and
4.1 percent for music. These differences are all highly statistically sig-
nificant.
Although trademarks can be renewed indefinitely, we find that
their average economic life is only about 15 percent longer than that
of the average copyright. The much higher renewal fees for trade-
marks may explain much of this difference. In 2000, it cost $300 to re-
new a trademark, compared to only $45 to renew a copyright." How-
ever, another factor is that trademarks lapse unless used, and use is
expensive, whereas a copyright can for example be renewed for a
book that is out of print -the hope being that there will be some fu-
ture interest in the book. Notice, finally, that the indefinite duration of
trademarks is less problematic than would be the case for copyrights,
because there are no social benefits to public domain trademarks, ex-
cept of course generic ones-but trademarks fall into the public do-
main when they become generic (that is, become names standardly
designating a class of products, such as "aspirin").
CONCLUSION
The regression results in Tables 1 and 2 are evidence that copy-
right registration and renewals are indeed highly responsive to eco-
nomic incentives, as our theory predicted. The shorter the expected
life of a copyright and the higher the registration and renewal fees, the
less likely are both registration and renewal. This in turn suggests that
a system of modestly higher registration and renewal fees than at pre-
sent, a relatively short initial term (twenty years or so), and a right of
indefinite renewal would cause a large number of copyrighted works
76 Patents have a kind of renewal component too. A patent cannot be renewed after the
expiration of its twenty-year statutory term; but even for it to remain in force for the full twenty
years the patentee must pay maintenance fees of $890 at three and a half years, $2,050 at seven
and a half years, and $3,150 at eleven and a half years after the patent has been issued. 37 CFR §
1.20(e)-(g) (2003). See also 35 USC § 41(b) (2000) (establishing statutory baselines of $830,
$1,900, and $2,910, respectively); 35 USC § 41(f) (2000) (authorizing yearly fee adjustments to
track the Consumer Price Index). In effect, a patent holder gets to enjoy the full twenty-year
term only if he "renews" his patent three times. One study indicates that 82.6 percent of patents
were still in force (in other words, had been "renewed") after four years, 57.4 percent after eight
years, and 37.1 percent after twelve years. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Of-
fice, 95 Nw U L Rev 1495, 1504 (2001) (calculating the percentage of patents for which mainte-
nance fees were paid, by age of patent). We have estimated depreciation rates from these data of
4.8 percent over the first four years after issue, 6.9 percent from five to eight years, and 8.3 per-
cent thereafter. Over the full twenty-year period, the depreciation rate is about 6 percent. Put
differently, we estimate an average economic life for a patent (given maintenance fees) of about
16.6 years, which includes a full twenty-year term for about 30 percent of issued patents.
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to be returned to the public domain quite soon after they were cre-
ated. Of course, those would tend to be works of low average com-
mercial value; otherwise, the owner would have renewed. And requir-
ing registration and renewal for copyright protection, rather than, as
at present, making these steps optional, would increase the incentive
to take them. Nevertheless, a system of indefinite renewals (or one
that combines renewals with a maximum duration) may enable society
to have its cake and eat it too. More works will be in the public do-
main, thus minimizing access, transaction, and administrative costs,
while those few copyrights that retain their value will remain in copy-
right protection indefinitely, with the economic advantages, involving
investments in maintenance and the avoidance of congestion external-
ities, that we discussed earlier.
Granted, the more valuable works are also those that confer mo-
nopoly power and thus create deadweight loss if the duration of a
copyright is extended. But we have given reasons for questioning
whether deadweight loss is a serious consequence of extending copy-
right, at least if the system of indefinite renewals is available only for
works created after the system is instituted. However, a benefit of in-
definite renewal that should be especially emphasized, but that would
be maximized by making the system available to existing copyrights as
well, is that it would largely eliminate the rent-seeking problem that is
created by the fact that copyright protection expires at a fixed date.
Owners of valuable copyrights that are soon to expire will (along with
enterprises that would like to appropriate the copyrightable works
without charge) expend real resources on trying to persuade (or dis-
suade) Congress to extend the term.
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